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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Val Leppert*
and Stephen A. McCullers**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2015 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit' included precedential opinions on a variety of important
evidentiary issues. Several Eleventh Circuit cases, as well as a key
decision from the United States Supreme Court, further explored the
contours of the Confrontation Clause. The Eleventh Circuit also
considered a number of cases regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony at trial. These cases seem to continue the Eleventh Circuit's
recent trend of applying greater scrutiny to lower court decisions
excluding expert evidence, while applying a more deferential standard
when the lower court allowed expert evidence.
Also noteworthy were two published Eleventh Circuit opinions
concerning the relevance and prejudicial effect of "bad act" evidence. In
one case involving charges of identity theft and filing false tax returns,
the court affirmed the admission of the defendant's other acts of fraud.
In the other, the court held that evidence of the defendants' memberships in white supremacist gangs was not unfairly prejudicial where this
evidence was relevant to criminal intent. Finally, the court provided
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College (B.A. 2004); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2010).
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1. For an analysis of evidence law during the prior survey period, see W. Randall
Bassett, Val Leppert & Stephen A. McCullers, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 66
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useful guidance on the application of the residual exception to the
hearsay rule, stressing that this exception should only be used in
"exceptional circumstances." This Evidence Survey describes all of these
rulings to provide practitioners with a concise overview of how the law
of evidence evolved in the Eleventh Circuit during 2015.
II.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES

The Confrontation Clause

In criminal prosecutions, the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution' guarantees the accused's
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."3 In 1980, the
Supreme Court held in Ohio v. Roberts' that the Clause allows the
admission of an out-of-court statement by an unavailable witness if the
statement bore "adequate indicia of reliability;" for example, if the
statement fell "within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or had
But the Court
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'
repudiated the Roberts approach in 2004, holding in Crawford v.
Washington6 the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of "[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial," unless "the declarant
is unavailable" and the defendant "had a prior opportunity to crossexamine" the declarant.' Since Crawford, courts have tried to define
when an out-of-court statement is "testimonial" and thus implicates the
Clause. As a general matter, testimonial statements are those that a
declarant "would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."' Courts
therefore examine whether the "primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."' Examples of testimonial statements include "formal
statement[s] to government officers, . . . affidavits, custodial examinations, [and] prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine."' 0

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
States

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 66.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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In the 2015 term, the Supreme Court decision Ohio v. Clark" and a
couple of opinions from the Eleventh Circuit shed further light on when
an out-of-court statement is testimonial. In Clark, a jury sentenced the
defendant to twenty-eight years imprisonment after concluding that he
had brutally abused his girlfriend's children. Central to the prosecution's case against the defendant were the out-of-court statements by one
of the victims-a three-year-old boy who told his teachers at school that
the defendant was responsible for the severe injuries the teachers had
discovered. The defendant argued, and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed,
that the boy's identification of the defendant as the perpetrator was a
testimonial out-of-court statement barred by the Confrontation
Clause.12
However, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the boy's
statements were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the
teachers' questions about the identity of the perpetrator was not to
prosecute the defendant, but rather to protect the boy and other children
from further abuse by the same person." As the Court noted, "There
is no indication that the primary purpose of the conversation was to
gather evidence for [the defendant's] prosecution. On the contrary, it is
clear that the first objective was to protect [the child]." 4 Several
observations buttressed the Court's conclusion that the statements were
not testimonial: (1) the teachers never informed the boy "that his
answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser," (2) the boy "never
hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or
prosecutors," (3) the conversation between the boy and his teachers "was
informal and spontaneous," and (4) the boy's young age makes it
"extremely unlikely" that "[he] would intend his statements to be a
substitute for trial testimony."
Two additional aspects of the Clark opinion are worth noting. First,
the Court addressed a question it had previously reserved-whether the
Confrontation Clause even applies to statements made to persons other
than law enforcement.' 6 The Court refused to "adopt a categorical rule"
excluding statements to non-law enforcement persons "from the Sixth
Amendment's reach," but it added "such statements are much less likely
to be testimonial than statements to law enforcement officers."'

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
Id. at 2177, 2178-79.
Id. at 2180-81.
Id. at 2181.
Id. at 2181, 2182.
Id. at 2181.
Id.
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Second, the opinion contains dicta that drew the ire of Justices Scalia
and Ginsburg in a concurring opinion. After explaining that "a
statement cannot fall within the Confrontation Clause unless its primary
purpose was testimonial," the Court's opinion cautions that this "does
not mean that the Confrontation Clause bars every statement that
satisfies the 'primary purpose' test."'" Noting that the Confrontation
Clause "does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that
would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the
founding," the Court explained "the primary purpose test is a necessary,
but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court
statements under the Confrontation Clause."" In other words, the
Clause does not necessarily bar the admission of all testimonial out-ofcourt statements; there may be additional considerations such as
whether the statement would have been admissible around the time the
Sixth Amendment was passed.
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg were none too pleased with this aspect
of the opinion, calling it "absolutely false" and unsupported by precedent.2 0 According to the concurring opinion, "[tihe Confrontation
Clause categorically entitles a defendant to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; and the primary-purpose test sorts out, among
the many people who interact with the police informally, who is acting
as a witness and who is not. Those who fall into the former category
bear testimony, and are therefore acting as 'witnesses,' subject to the
right of confrontation."2 ' The concurring opinion concludes emphatically, "There are no other mysterious requirements that the Court declines
to name."22
The Eleventh Circuit applied the primary purpose test in two cases
during the last term. In United States v. Wilson,2 3 the court held text
messages between the defendant's former attorney and a government
agent were not testimonial and thus did not implicate the Confrontation
Clause.24 Observing that the messages were informal communications
to coordinate the delivery of certain boxes, the court determined the
"cooperative and informal nature of those text messages was such that

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 2180.
Id.
Id. at 2184-85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2185 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1317.
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an objective witness would [not] reasonably expect [the texts] to be used
prosecutorially."2 5
The Eleventh Circuit reached the same result in United States v.
Rodriguez,26 an unpublished opinion affirming a conviction of two
defendants (Rodriguez and Robinson) for armed robbery.27 Rodriguez
argued that the government's admission of certain conversations
between a now-deceased co-conspirator and his girlfriend violated the
Confrontation Clause.28
The court held the relevant statements
"plainly were not made with the primary purpose of aiding in a criminal
investigation, as they were from private conversations [the now-deceased
co-conspirator] had with his girlfriend outside the trial context." 29
The Rodriguez case also provided occasion for the court to address a
question it had not previously answered: whether statements must be
testimonial to violate the Bruton"o bar against the use of confessions by
non-testifying criminal defendants in a joint trial to the extent the
statements directly inculpate a co-defendant, though they might be
otherwise admissible against the confessing defendant."'
Louis
Robinson, the second defendant in Rodriguez, contended that the
admission of the now-deceased co-conspirator's statements to his
girlfriend violated the Bruton bar because they implicated Robinson in
the offense without affording him a chance for cross-examination.32
Following the approach of several other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Bruton's "protections only apply to testimonial statements" because Bruton "was premised on the Confrontation Clause.""
And because the now-deceased co-conspirator's conversations with his
girlfriend were not testimonial, the Bruton bar was inapplicable."
While Rodriguez was an unpublished opinion-and therefore is not
considered binding precedent"-it does provide insight into how the
court would analyze the Bruton issue and it may be cited as persuasive
authority.

25. Id. at 1316 (alterations in original); see also infra note 172 and accompanying text,
regarding the court's hearsay analysis of the text messages in Wilson.
26. 591 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2015).
27. Id. at 898, 900.
28. Id. at 901.
29. Id.
30. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
31. See id. at 126.
32. 591 F. App'x at 901.
33. Id. at 902.
34. Id.
35. 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.
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In addition to the two cases addressing the "testimonial" requirement,
the Eleventh Circuit issued one more noteworthy decision involving the
Confrontation Clause. In United States v. Reese," the court concluded
that the Confrontation Clause does not apply in supervised release
revocation hearings. 7 The district court revoked Reese's supervised
release after finding that he had committed a new controlled substance
offense. Reese appealed this order, arguing that it violated his rights
under the Clause because the district court decision was based on the
admission of lab test results the government presented through a police
officer without affording Reese an opportunity to cross-examine the
technician who had performed the test." But the Eleventh Circuit held
that Reese had no right to cross-examine the lab technician because
"[t]he Sixth Amendment applies only to 'criminal prosecutions,' which
does not include parole revocation hearings."" The court noted that
this conclusion was in accord with eight other circuits also holding "the
Sixth Amendment does not apply in hearings for the revocation of
supervised release, probation, or parole.""
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

B.

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States"'
prevents a person from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."" In the seminal case Miranda v. Arizona,'3
the United States Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment requires
the prosecution to "demonstrate[] the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination" before using
a defendant's statements "stemming from custodial interrogation" at
trial." This decision, of course, lead to the well-known Miranda
warning, which is designed to inform a suspect of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent." Once an accused invokes their right to
silence, all questioning must stop until legal counsel is available." In
United States v. Brantley,4 7 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

775 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1329.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 444.
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481 (1981).
Id. at 484-85.
803 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2015).
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prosecuting someone for failing to report a felony violates their Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, where reporting the felony would
have revealed the defendant also committed a crime."
The Brantley case involved a charge of misprision of a felony," which
is the failure to report a felony coupled with concealing or participating
in the crime.'o The charge stemmed from a police traffic stop gone
terribly wrong. In the early morning hours of June 29, 2010, officers for
the Tampa Police Department pulled Brantley over during a routine
traffic stop. When the two officers directed Brantley's boyfriend, a
convicted felon sitting in the passenger seat, to exit the vehicle, the
boyfriend shot and seriously wounded the officers. The boyfriend then
fled on foot while Brantley sped away in her car. The two officers died
from their wounds. 1
Immediately after the shooting, Brantley and her boyfriend communicated with each other by cell phone and text messages. The text
messages included discussions of how the two should lay low for some
time and that Brantley should hide her vehicle.
Brantley then
attempted to hide out in an apartment after leaving her car some
distance away and parked in a manner to conceal the license plate. The
police eventually located Brantley and, while she admitted to being
pulled over and fleeing the scene, she refused to provide the police with
her boyfriend's name. The police found the boyfriend a few days later
and charged him with the two murders. Brantley was charged and
convicted of misprision of a felony for failing to report that a convicted
felon, her boyfriend, possessed a firearm.5 2
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Brantley argued the charge of
misprision of a felony violated her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Specifically, she argued that reporting her boyfriend's
felony-possession of a firearm-would have revealed she had committed
a crime-fleeing the scene. Thus, she argued, requiring her to report the
felony violated her right to remain silent."
The Eleventh Circuit, however, found this argument wholly without
merit. 5 4 The court stressed she was not charged for her silence but for
her affirmative acts of hiding herself, hiding the car, and communicating

48.

Id. at 1273, 1274-75.

49. Id. at 1268.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).
Brantley, 803 F.3d at 1268-69.
Id. at 1269, 1269-70.
Id. at 1270, 1274.
Id. at 1274-75.
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with her boyfriend in an attempt to conceal his crime. 5 Thus, her
crime was not merely remaining silent about her boyfriend's possession
of a firearm, but actively concealing evidence." The court held the
Fifth Amendment does not shield a defendant from acts of concealment
and affirmed her conviction. 7
III.

EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence" controls the admissibility
of expert opinion testimony." The rule requires the proponent of the
evidence to show that (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently
regarding the matters she intends to address; (2) the methodology by
which the expert reaches her conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3)
the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue.o
61
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
the Supreme Court
held Rule 702 calls for district courts to perform a "gatekeeping" function
before they can admit expert testimony. 62 This function is critically
important, given that an expert's opinion "can be both powerful and
quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it."" "Indeed,
no other kind of witness is free to opine about a complicated matter
without any firsthand knowledge of the facts in the case."" District
courts must therefore "conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations
of expert opinions" 65 to "make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field."66

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1275.
58. FED. R. EVID. 702.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc); City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998); see also FED. R.
EVID. 702.
61. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
62. Id. at 589 n.7.
63. Id. at 595.
64. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260.
65. Id. (quoting McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir.
2002)).
66. Id.
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At the same time, district judges enjoy "considerable leeway" in
performing the Rule 702 gatekeeping function." Appellate courts apply
the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a ruling concerning the
admissibility of expert testimony and therefore can reverse only when
the ruling is "manifestly erroneous."6 8 As the Eleventh Circuit put it,
"we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear
error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard."6 9
Applying this standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed
the lower courts' Daubert rulings in over 70% of published cases since
the beginning of this decade. It is worth noting that the court has
affirmed every ruling admitting expert evidence over a Daubertobjection
in the last six years.7 0 By contrast, rulings excluding expert evidence
have ostensibly received greater scrutiny. All five published cases
reversing a Daubert ruling since 2010 involved the lower court's
exclusion of expert evidence." The commonalities between these five
cases go even further: each of them was a civil case in which the district
court excluded the plaintiffs key expert testimony.72 In four of the five
cases, the exclusion of the expert resulted in the grant of summary
judgment to the defendant." In the fifth case, the plaintiff made it to
trial but the exclusion of the expert limited the evidence and likely
contributed to a defense verdict.
This apparent trend of the Eleventh Circuit to apply closer scrutiny to
rulings excluding expert evidence brings to mind the Supreme Court's
7
There, the plaintiff
'
1997 decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.
cancer as a result
had
developed
that
he
alleging
sued General Electric,
in products
contained
substances
harmful
to
exposure
of his work-related

67.
68.

Id. at 1258-59.
Id. at 1259.

69. Id.
70. One exception to this pattern was United States v. Harrell, 751 F.3d 1235 (11th
Cir. 2014), where the Eleventh Circuit determined the district court abused its discretion
in allowing a detective to testify as an expert, but the error was harmless. Id. at 1243.
71. See Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015); Adams
v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014); United Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ala. Power Co., 730
F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013); Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1194
(11th Cir. 2011).
72. See Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1279; Adams, 760 F.3d at 1326; Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d
at 1288; United Fire & Cas. Co., 704 F.3d at 1343; Rosenfeld, 654 F.3d at 1194.
73. The four cases in which the exclusion of the expert led to a summary judgment to
the defendant are Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1279; Adams, 760 F.3d at 1326; Ala. Power Co., 730
F.3d at 1280; and United Fire & Cas. Co., 704 F.3d at 1343.
74. See Rosenfeld, 654 F.3d at 1194.
75. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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manufactured by the company. However, the district court excluded the
plaintiff's causation expert under Daubert and then granted summary
judgment to General Electric because the plaintiff could not establish a
causal connection between the alleged exposure and his cancer. On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating that a "particularly
stringent" standard of review applies when the lower court's ruling
excludes (as opposed to admits) evidence."
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eleventh Circuit decision
in Joiner and reinstated the district court ruling." In so doing, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "[a] court of appeals applying 'abuse of
discretion' review to such rulings may not categorically distinguish
between rulings allowing expert testimony and rulings which disallow
it."" The Supreme Court specifically rejected the contention that the
lower court's ruling "should have been subjected to a more searching
standard of review" because it resulted in summary judgment and was
therefore "outcome determinative.""' Put simply, "[in applying an
overly stringent review" to the ruling excluding the plaintiff's expert
evidence, the Eleventh Circuit "failed to give the trial court the deference
that is the hallmark of abuse of discretion review.""
Despite the Supreme Court's admonition, the Eleventh Circuit
arguably continued its tendency of more closely scrutinizing exclusions
of expert evidence during the 2015 term. While the court affirmed four
out of five Daubert rulings,"' the lone reversal was again in a civil case
in which the district court had excluded the plaintiff's key expert
testimony and then granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. In Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,82 the plaintiff fractured
her wrist after slipping and falling on the deck of the defendant's cruise
ship." To prove that the defendant was negligent in maintaining the
deck, the plaintiff sought to present the expert testimony of Dr. Roland
Zollo, who had tested the deck's slip resistance and concluded that it "did
not meet the minimum [slip-resistance] standard for passenger
walkways" set forth by the American Society for Testing and Materials

76.

Id. at 139, 140, 140-41.

77. Id. at 147.
78. Id. at 142.
79. Id. at 142-43.
80. Id. at 143.
81. The four affirmed rulings were United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1042 (11th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064, 1070 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2015); and United States v. Rodriguez, 591 F. App'x
897, 900 (11th Cir. 2015).
82. 796 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015).
83. Id. at 1279.
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(ASTM)." Dr. Zollo further opined that "due to the 'wide range of
friction resistance along the walkway[,]' the deck 'trap[ped] individuals
via a false sense of security."' 85
The district court excluded Dr. Zollo's opinions based on the second
prong of the Rule 702 analysis-the reliability of the methodology the
expert employed in reaching his conclusions. As to the first opinion, the
district court found that the ASTM standard Dr. Zollo relied on applied
only to crew members-not to passengers like the plaintiff. In addition,
the slip-resistance tests were unreliable because Dr. Zollo conducted
them almost a year and a half after the accident occurred and thus
failed to show that the condition of the deck was the same as when the
plaintiff slipped and fell." As to Dr. Zollo's second opinion, the district
court concluded "Dr. Zollo's 'false sense of security' theory ...
was
unreliable because he had not tested the [slip resistance] of the deck
along the path Ms. Sorrels traveled before she slipped."" Having
excluded Dr. Zollo's expert testimony, the district court granted
summary judgment because the plaintiff's remaining evidence failed to
create a question of fact as to the defendant's negligence."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's exclusion
of Dr. Zollo's first opinion but affirmed the exclusion of the second."
The appellate court held the district judge abused his discretion in
concluding that the ASTM standard applied only to crew members.90
Noting that the ASTM publication states the standards shall apply to all
structures with which the crew members come in contact, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that the ASTM standards may apply in this case
because crew members come in contact with the deck where the accident
occurred." As the court explained, "A deck constructed of a single
material (here, teakwood) cannot be designed to meet two different [slipresistance] standards-one for passengers and one for crew members-at
the same time."9 2
The Eleventh Circuit also concluded the district court abused its
discretion in holding Dr. Zollo's first opinion was unreliable because he
tested the deck nearly a year and a half after the accident." In so

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1280.
at 1280-81.
at 1281.
at 1284, 1285.
at 1282-83.
at 1283.
at 1283-84.

918

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

holding, the court rejected the proposition that a "substantial similarity"
prerequisite foreclosed the admission of Dr. Zollo's tests." After all,
Dr. Zollo did not opine that the deck failed to meet the slip-resistance
standard at the time of the accident.' The delay between the accident
and the test can be explored on cross examination and thus goes to the
weight and not to the admissibility of the opinion." The Eleventh
Circuit further observed that the defendant had not raised the delay as
grounds for exclusion, presumably because the defendant's own expert
tested the deck on the same day Dr. Zollo performed his tests."
Likewise, the defendant's expert agreed with Dr. Zollo that "the wet
condition of the pool deck when tested was substantially similar to its
condition at the time of the accident."" As such, the delay between the
test and accident could not support the district court's exclusion of Dr.
Zollo's first opinion.99
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
exclusion of Dr. Zollo's second opinion-the "false sense of security"
theory.o Given that Dr. Zollo did not perform any slip-resistance
tests along the path where the plaintiff actually travelled before the
accident, he could not reliably conclude the plaintiff was lulled into a
false sense of security by the variation in slip resistance along her
path.' Dr. Zollo "could not cure the deficiency in his methodology by
merely walking along" the plaintiff's path and then "saying that he did
not feel he was going to slip;" an expert's "subjective physical and mental
perceptions are not the sort of reliable methodology Rule 702 demands."1 0 2
Other than the district court's exclusion of the expert's first opinion in
Sorrels, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all Daubert rulings in the 2015
term. In United States v. Hollis,0 s the court affirmed the exclusion of
the defendant's expert's testimony concerning the sufficiency of a latent
fingerprint for comparison.1o' The record revealed two pertinent facts:
(1) it was undisputed that the expert was not qualified to testify about
fingerprint comparisons (a conclusion the defendant did not challenge on

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1283-84.
Id. at 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
780 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1070.
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appeal); and (2) the expert "himself testified that the expertise required
to determine sufficiency [of the fingerprint] is identical to the expertise
required to perform comparisons."'o The district court therefore acted
within its discretion when it excluded the expert's opinion regarding the
sufficiency of the fingerprint.1 06
In two criminal cases involving conspiracies to sell drugs, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the lower court's admission of the government's
experts.o In United States v. Holt,18 the defendants raised a Daubert challenge to the opinion testimony of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent interpreting the meaning of the jargon and code
words used in the recorded conversations between the participants in the
The Eleventh Circuit held the district court
alleged conspiracy.'0o
correctly concluded that the agent's testimony satisfied all three
requirements of Rule 702.110 First, the agent was qualified to offer her
interpretations based on (1) her training and experience gained in over
six years with the DEA and (2) her review of ninety-nine percent of the
intercepted communications in the case."' According to the Eleventh
Circuit, these two circumstances also satisfied the second requirement-the agent's training and experience, applied to her thorough
review of virtually all communications between the co-conspirators,
constituted a reliable methodology for interpreting the meaning of the
communications." 2 Lastly, the court concluded the agent's testimony
assisted the jury in understanding the relevant communications.'
While a lay juror could perhaps guess the meaning of the code words,
the agent could interpret them "more accurately than a lay person or the
prosecutor."" 4
In United States v. Azmat," 5 the government alleged that a doctor
participated in a "pill-mill" scheme to unlawfully dispense controlled
substances such as oxycodone. To prove the doctor's prescriptions of
these drugs were "not medically legitimate," the government presented
an expert who opined that the defendant-doctor's treatment of his

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
See Holt, 777 F.3d 1234; Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018.
777 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1247, 1264.
Id. at 1264-65.
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1265-66.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015).
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patients fell below "minimum standards" required by the profession. 1
After a detailed review of the record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded "the
district court's pretrial denial of [the defendant-doctor's] Daubert motion
easily passes scrutiny.""' Before trial, the government outlined "the
numerous sources" the expert relied on, which "included federal and
state medical guidelines, literature from national organizations,
published journal articles, and textbooks."" The expert's "method of
reviewing patient files" involved his weighing of the defendant-doctor's
decisions "against the standards articulated in the above medical texts
and [the expert] exercising his judgment as an experienced medical
practitioner to reach conclusions concerning the legitimacy of [the
defendant-doctor's] courses of treatment."" 9
The expert also sufficiently explained the basis for his opinions at
trial.120 More specifically, the expert noted that "when providing
expert opinion on the prescribing practices of other physicians, he relies
on The Physicians'DeskReference, The Merck Manual, textbooks on pain
and pain management, and federal and state standards."l 2' He "then
consulted and summarized his expert worksheets, testifying that, under
the medical guidelines and standards of care for both Georgia and the
United States, [the defendant-doctor's] care fell outside of the usual
course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical purpose." 22 As a result, "[t]he district court did not make a clear error in
judgment or apply the wrong legal standard when it allowed the jury to
consider [the expert's] testimony, which was sufficiently reliable, in fact
and methodology, and more than ipse dixit."'2 3
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also approved the admission of the
government's expert testimony in United States v. Rodriguez,2 an
unpublished opinion affirming convictions related to armed robberies.12 The expert analyzed cell-site data placing the defendants "at
the scenes of several of the robberies."'2 6 On appeal, the defendants
focused on the district court's "failure to hold a Daubert hearing before

116. Id. at 1025, 1039.
117. Id. at 1042.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1042-43.
124. 591 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2015).
125. Id. at 898-99.
126. Id. at 899.
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qualifying" the expert.' 27 The Eleventh Circuit held "a district court
need not conduct a Daubert hearing where one would be unnecessary."1 28 Because the district court reviewed very similar testimony by
the same witness "on the near identical issue" in a different case, the
"district court did not abuse its discretion in not holding a Daubert
hearing."1 2 9
IV.

A.

NON-CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Relevance and PriorBad Acts

In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence allow all relevant evidence
to be admitted at trial."o Relevant evidence is broadly defined as
evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."'' There are, of course, some
important exceptions to the admission of relevant evidence. Federal
Rule of Evidence 403132 excludes the admission of relevant evidence
where "its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
Federal Rule of Evidence 404134 further prohibits the admission of
evidence of prior bad acts when used "to prove a person's character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.""' Such evidence, however, is admissible for other purposes, including "proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident."'36

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 899-900.
130. FED. R. EVID. 402; see also United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2011).
131. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
132. FED. R. EVID. 403.
133. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. 14-15603, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
21533, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (holding the admission of firearms and ammunition
into evidence is not unfairly prejudicial in a drug trafficking case because they are "tools
of the trade" for drug dealers and relevant to the defendant's involvement in drug activity).
134. FED. R. EVID. 404.
135. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
136. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196, 1201,
1202 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding evidence of six other fraudulent contracts were admissible
to show intent and absence of mistake where defendant pled not guilty and implied the
alleged fraud was merely a mistake).
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Some bad act evidence, however, falls outside the purview of Rule 404
and may be admitted as "intrinsic evidence."1 3 7 This includes evidence
that is (1) an uncharged offense arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete
the story, or (3) intertwined with the evidence of the charged of13
fense.a
While intrinsic evidence falls outside the scope of Rule 404,
the evidence must still satisfy the basic requirement of Rule 403: the
evidence's probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice. 3 9

In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit issued two published opinions considering the admission of evidence of bad acts and other crimes. 4 0 In
United States v. Ford,141 the Eleventh Circuit considered the admissibility of several types of bad act evidence in a criminal case involving
charges of fraud and identity theft.' 4 2 Over several years, a woman
who owned and managed a tax preparation business fraudulently
obtained personal information from other people (usually the homeless
or mentally ill) and used this information to file false tax returns. One
method she employed was convincing homeless people to give her
personal information so she could sign them up for a nonexistent
government assistance program. Eventually, investigators uncovered
her scheme and charged her with mail fraud, making a false claim, and
aggravated identity theft.1 43
At trial, the government called seventeen identity theft victims to
testify. Only eight of these victims, however, corresponded to the false
tax returns charged in the indictment. The other nine witnesses were
victims of similar, but uncharged, fraud by the defendant.
The
government also introduced four of the defendant's personal tax returns,
which contained false information. One of these returns used the same
false address that was also used on one of the fabricated tax returns.
Another falsely listed a homeless man as one of the defendant's
dependents. Finally, the government offered into evidence a video of an
undercover investigation by a local news channel. The video showed the
defendant asking an undercover investigator (who was pretending to be
homeless) for personal information for the fake government assistance

137. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007).
138. Id.
139. FED. R. EVID. 403; United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1205 n.9 (11th Cir.
2005), abrogatedon other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
140. See United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2015).
141. 784 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 2015).
142. Id. at 1391.
143. Id. at 1390.
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program. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges, and she was
sentenced to 111 months in jail plus restitution.144
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant argued the
district court committed multiple errors when admitting evidence under
Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.145 She claimed the court
abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of the nine victims
whose tax returns were not related to the offenses charged in the
indictment.14 The Eleventh Circuit, however, ruled this evidence did
not fall within the scope of Rule 404.17 Rather, the testimony from
the other victims was evidence of uncharged conduct that was part of the
same scheme and used the same method as the charged offenses.14
The other false tax returns were completed around the same time, using
the same common false addresses and the same methods to obtain
personal information; thus, the evidence was intrinsic evidence,
inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses and the district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.1 4 9
Turning to her personal tax returns, the defendant argued these were
only relevant to her character and therefore, under Rule 404, could not
be admitted to show she acted in accordance with that character in
relation to the charged offenses.'s
The Eleventh Circuit, however,
rejected this argument.'
The court held the defendant's personal
returns were relevant because on them she used the same false address
as some of the false returns and fraudulently listed one of the identity
theft victims as her dependent.' 52 Therefore, the personal returns
were admissible because they showed both the defendant's intent to
commit fraud and her lack of mistake. 5 3
Finally, concerning the undercover news video, the Eleventh Circuit
determined the video was intrinsic evidence that fell outside the scope
of Rule 4 0 4 .'" The defendant was accused of fraudulently obtaining
personal information from homeless individuals by claiming she could
get them money from a government program. This was exactly what the

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1390, 1391.
at 1391.
at 1394.

at 1393.

at 1394-95.
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video showed.' 5" Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held the video was a
specific instance of the defendant's scheme and therefore admissible as
part of the same series of transactions. 5 6
In United States v. LaFond,m the Eleventh Circuit had to determine
if the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two
defendants' memberships in white supremacist gangs in a second-degree
murder case.' 58 The two defendants were cellmates in a special
housing unit at a federal penitentiary. The murder victim, Mills, was
also an inmate in the special housing unit and shared a cell with a black
inmate. The defendants pressured Mills to have his black cellmate
replaced, but Mills refused. Shortly thereafter, while the defendants and
Mills were sharing a workout cage, the defendants attacked Mills from
behind, savagely kicking him in the head and chest. Mills died from his
injuries, and a federal grand jury indicted the defendants for seconddegree murder.'
Before trial, the defendants moved under Federal Rules of Evidence
403 and 404 to exclude evidence of their membership in the white
supremacist gangs. The district court denied the motions, finding
evidence of their membership in racist gangs showed their intent to
attack Mills and the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. On multiple occasions, the district
court instructed the jury that the evidence could only be used in
determining the defendants' intent and motive.' 60
Before the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants' renewed their arguments
that the evidence of their gang membership was inadmissible under
Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.161 The court, however, rejected both
arguments.' 62 Turning to Rule 404, the court held the evidence was
properly admitted as relevant to the defendants' intent and motive.6 3
In bringing its case, the government had a substantial burden to prove

155. Id.
156. Id. The defendant also argued the video was highly prejudicial and should have
been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Id. While the Eleventh Circuit agreed
the undercover investigation style of the video could be prejudicial, it noted the district
court required the video to be edited so only the defendant's actions with the reporter were
shown. Id. at 1395. Therefore, the prejudicial effect of the video was limited and any
remaining prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the video. Id.
157. 783 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2015).
158. Id. at 1219.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1219, 1220.
161. Id. at 1222.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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the defendants' intent to murder Mills with "malice aforethought."'"
The government introduced additional evidence that the white supremacist gangs' ideology required its members to force its racists beliefs on
other white inmates. Thus, by refusing to have his black cellmate
transferred, Mills violated the racist code of conduct of the defendants'
gangs.1 5 This provided motive for why the defendants (who claimed
self-defense) attacked Mills.

16 6

Considering Rule 403, the Eleventh Circuit determined the evidence
was highly probative of intent and motive as described above.167 While
evidence of membership in a racist gang is prejudicial because it "is
likely to provoke strong antipathy," the district court lessened the
possible prejudice through repeated instructions to the jury.1 6 8
Therefore, the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by
unfair prejudice, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting it.1 6 9

Hearsay and the Residual Exception
Hearsay is a statement made outside of a trial or hearing, which is
offered "in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."o
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 802,171 hearsay is inadmissible unless
it falls within an exception provided by federal statute or the Rules of
Evidence. 17 2 Some exceptions to the hearsay rule are available

B.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Holt, 777 F.3d at 1266-67 (affirming the admission of prior convictions
of possession of cocaine as relevant to the intent to deliver and traffic cocaine during the
same timeframe).
167. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1222.
168. Id. (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003)).
169. Id. Another issue to consider when admitting bad act evidence is whether there
is sufficient proof for a jury to find the defendant actually committed the bad act. Here,
the Eleventh Circuit determined there was ample evidence of the defendants' membership
in the gangs, including five witnesses that testified to their membership, evidence the
defendants questioned why a white inmate would have a black cellmate, and one of the
defendant's own admission to his involvement with the gang. Id.
170. FED. R. EVID. 801(C)(2).
171. FED. R. EVID. 802.
172. See id. There are, however, certain statements that are defined by the Rules of
Evidence as not being hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801. These include prior inconsistent
statements made by a witness, prior consistent statements used to rehabilitate credibility,
prior identifications, and admissions made by a party-opponent. Id.; see, e.g., United States
v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming the admission of text
messages from defendant's attorney to an IRS agent as non-hearsay under Rule 801
because the messages were made by the defendant's agent within the scope of employment).
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regardless of whether the person who made the statement is available
as a witness.' 7 3 These include the present sense impression, excited
utterance, medical diagnosis, business records, and recorded recollection
exceptions, among others. 1 74 Other exceptions, such as former testimony and statements made under the belief of imminent death, are only
available if the declarant is not available."' Finally-as if there were
not enough exceptions to the hearsay rule already-the Federal Rules
also include the so called "residual exception.""'
This catch-all
exception allows the admission of what would otherwise be hearsay if
the statement (1) has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"; (2) concerns a material fact; (3) is more probative than other
available evidence; and (4) will serve the purpose of the evidence rules
and the interests of justice if admitted. '7
This year, the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether statements between attorneys for codefendants had "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" sufficient
to be admitted to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 7
In Rivers v. United States,1'7 9 Rivers, who was convicted of conspiracy
to possess cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, claimed he
received ineffective assistance of counsel from his court-appointed
attorney. Specifically, Rivers claimed his attorney never discussed his
case with him, including the evidence the government had against him
or the possibility of a plea deal. He argued that if he had understood the
evidence and the plea offer, he would have accepted the plea, resulting
in a lesser sentence.180
In an evidentiary hearing before the district court, the government
called an attorney, Rodriguez, who was counsel for a co-defendant during
Rivers' criminal trial. The government asked Rodriquez about discussions he had with Rivers' counsel regarding conversations between
Rivers' counsel and Rivers. 8 1 Rivers objected on hearsay grounds, but
the district court overruled the objection under Federal Rule of Evidence
807,182 the residual exception to hearsay.8"' Specifically, the district

173. FED. R. EVID. 803; see, e.g., Curtis v. Perkins (In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs., LLC), 781
F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming the admission of documents under the
business records exception to hearsay found in Rule 803).
174. FED. R. EVID. 803.
175. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)-(2).
176. FED. R. EVID. 807.
177. Id.
178. Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2015).
179. 777 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2015).
180. Id. at 1307, 1308-09.
181. Id. at 1310.
182. FED. R. EVID. 807.
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court found that "as an officer of the Court," Rodriguez "would not
proffer any false testimony.""' Furthermore, the district court found
conversations between attorneys for the co-defendants "have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," meeting the requirement of the
residual exception.'" 5 Rodriguez was therefore allowed to testify and
he described conversations he had with Rivers' counsel, where Rivers'
counsel claimed he reviewed the government's evidence and discussed
the plea agreement with Rivers."8
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with Rivers that the district
court erred in admitting Rodriguez's testimony.8 7 The circuit court
first noted the residual exception should only be "used very rarely, and
only in exceptional circumstances."' 8 Thus, the exception "appl[ies]
only when certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and
when high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present."'89 As
an initial matter, the court noted the central question was not whether
Rodriguez was trustworthy, but whether the person who originally made
the statements was trustworthy.'
In determining the trustworthiness of the original statements, courts look to several factors including
the motivation of making the statement, the surrounding circumstances,
the knowledge of the declarant, any corroborating evidence, and any
incentive the declarant had to make a false statement.' 9
Under this framework, the district court provided only one reason to
admit the hearsay statements made by Rivers' counsel: the fact the
statements were made to Rodriguez, who was counsel to one of Rivers'

183. Rivers, 777 F.3d at 1310.
184. Id. (quoting the district court).
185. Id. The district court also found the evidence met the other requirements of the
residual exception because it was offered as evidence of a material fact, was more probative
than other available evidence, and served the interests of justice for the court to have this
evidence. Id. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed these other three requirements were met. Id. at 1316 n.9.
186. Id. at 1311.
187. Id. at 1316.
188. Id. at 1312 (quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir.
2009)).
189. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1279).
190. Id. at 1313. The circuit court did note, however, that at least the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considers the reliability of the witness in assessing
the applicability of the residual exception to hearsay. Id. at 1313 n.6 (citing United States
v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1978)). Because, however, the Eleventh Circuit held Rivers'
counsel's statements were not sufficiently trustworthy when made, the court did not reach
the question of whether Rodriguez's credibility should be weighted in determining whether
to admit the evidence under the residual exception. Id.
191. Id. at 1315.
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The Eleventh Circuit, however, held this was
co-defendants. 9 2
insufficient.1 93 If Rivers' attorney was failing to provide adequate
assistance of counsel (as Rivers claimed), he would have had every
incentive to lie. But the district court's reasoning assumed "statements
made by an attorney to counsel for a codefendant are inherently
trustworthy simply because they are made by a lawyer during the course
of representing a criminal defendant" and even an incompetently
performing attorney would not lie about the level of assistance he or she
was providing.' 4 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this reasoning and
held the evidence lacked the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required to be admitted under the residual exception.' 95

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1316. The Eleventh Circuit went on, however, to determine the district
court's error was harmless because Rivers failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1318.

